Hi,
is this version: system/xz 5.6.1-1 -> 5.6.1-2 the one with the backdoor ?
https://lwn.net/ml/oss-security/
[email protected]/
https://blog.holz.nu/2024/03/29/0.html
In the other thread on this issue (https://forum.artixlinux.org/index.php/topic,6643.0) I see this
and detection is mentioned with
ldd $(command -v sshd) | grep liblzma
empty results is good.
Hi,
Thank you.
I downgraded XZ ( https://archive.artixlinux.org/packages/x/xz/xz-5.4.6-1-x86_64.pkg.tar.zst )
and listet it as non-update-able.
Hi,
the person who inserted the backdoor into xz was 2 years contributing to xz before he included the backdoor.
The only way to prevent/make it really hard to do it again is to make a list of Linux core programs and libraries from what is really running in the 10 most popular Linux use cases.
And check and test every update of this core programs and libraries.
IBM and Google would have the resources to trace 250+ Linux core programs and libraries.
I found this page (https://www.nongnu.org/lzip/xz_inadequate.html) interesting to read... :(
True thing in that page is that xz is kind of redundant, there is a promising lzma based one which is much better called lrzip, and also the native 7-zip binary that is for some reason still not packaged, not sure of it's license compared to p7zip.
And even without lzma i can see bzip2 being modified for equivalent compression but much better reliability.
Zstd is just for decompression speed imo.
If we don't get a reply from the Dev's I'd recommend downgrading and blocking the upgrade until we get confirmation.
Upgrade the package. The latest version of package is not affected by said vulnerability.